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1 INTRODUCTION 
Section 236 of the 1996 ConstitutionZ provides for the public funding of 
political parties as follows: 
"To enhance multi-party democracy. national legislation must provide for the 
funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures 
on an equitable and proportional basis." 
Along with a number of other provisions in the Constitution. section 236 
obligates Parliament to pass legislation to give effect to a broad constitu-
tional provision. This obligation must be fulfilled "within a reasonable period 
of the date the new Constitution took. effect",l In respect of section 236 
this has been done by the adoption of the Public Funding of Represented 
Political Parties Act 1 03 of 1997, which was assented to by the President 
on 27 November 1997 and which. by proclamation on 14 August 1 998. 
came into operation retrospectively on 1 April 1998.-
The Act provides a broad framework. for the public funding of political 
parties. A Represented Political Parties' Fund is established for the pur-
pose of funding political parties that participate in the National Assembly 
and provincial legislatures. Moneys will be appropriated to the Fund by 
Parliament but contributions and donations to the Fund could also originate 
The initial report on which this paper is based. was prepared for a joint project of the 
Community Law Centre and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 
(NDI) on the public funding of political parties. The assistance of NDJ and the instruc-
tive comments and suggestions given by Prof Fred Wertheimer (USA), Dr Menachem 
Hofnung (Hebrew University. Jerusalem), Mr Peter Milliken MP (Canada) and Mr Mi-
chael Stoddard (USA) are gratefully acknowledged. 
2 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 1996 Act 108 of 1996, referred to as 
the Constitution, 
3 Item 21 (I) Schedule 6 Constitution. 
4 S 11 (2) of the Act provides that in determining when the Act comes into operation, the 
PreSident may, after consultation with the Minister of Finance. give it retrospective ef-










































I LAW,DEMOCRACY &. DEVEl.OPMENT I 
from private sources within or outside the Republic. The Fund is managed 
by the Chief Electoral Officer, under the direction of the Electoral Com-
mission. Every political party is entitled to be allocated moneys from the 
Fund for every financial year that it is represented in Parliament and/or a 
provincial legislature. The moneys received may be used by a political 
party "for any purpose compatible with its functioning as a political party 
in a modern democracy".5 The Act also details persons who may not 
receive such moneys and purposes for which they may not be used. While 
the Act gives broad criteria for the proportional and equitable allocation of 
moneys to political parties, a committee of the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces must determine the exact formula. The Act 
also contains detailed provisions for ensuring that political parties give 
adequate account of the appropriate use of the moneys. 
The aim of this paper is to assess whether this Act has met the constitu-
tional requirements of section 236 of the Constitution as well as, more 
broadly, the objective of enhancing multi-party democracy. In this regard 
it is useful to compare this Act with the party financing laws of Germany 
and Israel, two established multi-party democracies which have compa-
rable electoral systems and where political parties are directly funded. 6 
2 OBJECTIVE OF THE LEGISLATION: "TO ENHANCE 
MULTI~PARTY DEMOCRACY" 
The objective of the legislation "to enhance multi-party democracy" -
calls first for an examination of this concept within the meaning of the 
Constitution. 
The model of multi-party democracy that underpins the Constitution is 
that of a political system in which more than one political party compete 
for political power and where the health and prosperity of the system are 
dependent on viable and vigorous parties which are able to solicit support 
from the electorate and provide a realistic alternative to the governing 
party. This model is apparent from the foundational values of the Constitution 
as well as the specific provisions establishing a parliamentary democracy. 
One of the founding values of the Constitution is a "multi-party system 
of democratic government".? The first principle to give effect to this value 
is the freedom to establish political parties. The Bill of Rights specifically 
provides that, in exercising the freedom "to make political choices," every 
citizen has the right 
Uta) to form a political party; 
(b) to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party. and 
(e) to campaign for a political party or cause ... 8 
5 S 5(1)(b). 
6 In Israel the electoral system of proportional representation is based on a pure list 
system, while in Germany party lists are combined with constituencies. 
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The representative function of political parties - to articulate and repre-
sent the political choices of citizens - is thus clearly established. 
As the formation of political parties is the product of the VOluntary ex-
ercise of a political freedom. the pluralistic nature of the South African 
society. divided along numerous lines, (which is also recognised in the 
Constitution·), will elicit different political choices and hence more than 
one political party. 
The exercise of state power by political parties is legitimated through 
elections. Political parties compete for power in accordance with the 
Constitution's other founding values of "regular elections" based on 
"universal adult suffrage [and] a national common voters roll".'o These 
basic democratic values are further enshrined in the Bill of Rights, namely 
the right to "free, fair and regular elections" for legislative bodies" and the 
right to a secret vote.'2 
The proper functioning of the formal institutions of democracy - the 
national and provincial legislatures - is premised on the notion that politi-
cal parties other than the governing party play an essential role in the 
system of checks and balances. Apart from the usual oppositional role of 
minority parties in debating policy issues and performing a watchdog role 
over the executive, the Constitution provides that the rules and orders of 
the National Assembly must provide for "the participation in the Assembly 
and its committees of minority parties represented in the Assembly. in a 
manner consistent with democracy".'3 
The bedrock of multi-party democracy is that all significant political 
choices are voiced in the legislatures. The formal guarantees for multi-party 
democracy are not sufficient by themselves to ensure this. In a mar-
ket-orientated economy, the uneven distribution of money in society and 
hence to political parties, may result in some voices not being heard at all 
because of poverty. or other voices dominating because of wealth. In 
order to address the problem that political parties may not be able to 
perform their proper function in a multi-party democracy due to a lack of 
finances, the Constitution thus obligates the state to provide public funds 
for political parties. The formal constitutional values and guarantees are 
thereby supplemented by the material resources promised in section 
236. ,. Although all parties benefit from public funding, it may enhance 
multi-party democracy by ensuring at least the survival of small parties. 
9 The preamble refers to "our diversity" and the "divisions of the past". 
10 5 1 (d) Constitution. 
II 519(2). 
12 S 19(3). 
13 5 57(2). See also s I 16(2)(b) for provincial legislatures. In addition, the leader of the 
largest opposition party in the National Assembly must receive recognition as the 
Leader of the Opposition (s 57(2)(d». With regard to the National Assembly's power of 
appointment, all parties in the Assembly must be represented in proportion to their 
numbers on the committee that nominates persons as members of the state institu-
tions supporting constitutional democracy (s I 93(5}(a)). 
14 The same principle applies to the functioning of the legislatures. The Constitution 
provides that the rules and orders of the National Assembly must provide for "financial 










































The other principal reason for the public funding of political parties is 
that it enhances the integrity of the political system. It reduces parties' 
dependence on outside funding, which may lead to corruption and the 
manipulation of the political system by monied interests. Multi-party 
democracy is thus enhanced where public funding is coupled to public 
disclosure of party finances and limitations are placed on donations to, 
and spending by. a party. The competition between political choices is real 
when it can be said that the political playing field is level - there is equal-
ity of opportunity. Parties favoured by monied interests should thus not be 
able to smother other legitimate voices simply because of superior finan-
cial resources. Furthermore, by reducing the need to raise funds from the 
wealthy, public funding may also prevent that a party's agenda or actions 
are compromised. If multi-party democracy is the objective, then party 
funding should be approached in its totality. 
While one of the aims of public funding is the economic survival of po-
litical parties, it may. if it becomes the sole source of party finances, 
undermine the very objective of multi-party democracy. Political parties 
are an expression of citizens's free political choices and they, the citizens. 
should retain ownership of their parties. Through public funding parties 
may become appendages of the state and independent of their members 
and supporters. The objective that parties articulate and represent the 
political choices of voters could thus be defeated if the vital citizen-party 
link is attenuated. IS 
If very small or micro parties are kept alive artificially by public funding. 
it could also undermine the stability of the political system. Given the very 
low threshold for entry into Parliament (0.25 % of the votes or approxi-
mately 50 000 votes) the proliferation of micro parties may create unsta-
ble governments. The public funding of political parties should thus not 
operate to the detriment of the political system as a whole by encouraging 
and supporting very small or micro parties which represents a negligible, 
if not a temporary, voice of voters. 
3 FUNDING 
3.1 Purposes of funding 
Political parties need funds for three main purposes. First and foremost. to 
fight an election campaign, second. to maintain a viable party organi-
sation between elections. and third, to provide research facilities and 
and administrative assistance to each party represented in the Assembly. to enable the 
party and its leader to perform their functions in the Assembly effectively" (s 57(2)(c) 
Constitution). See also s 1 16(2)(c) with regard to provincial legislatures. 
15 In Germany the concept of "Parteifreiheit" underlies German Party Law of 1994. The 
principle holds that parties should not become appendages of the state and lose their 
representative function. The German Federal Court thus held in 1992 that the amount 
of public funding a party receives can never be more than 50% of its total income. The 
amount of public funding a party receives is thus calculated with reference to the num-
ber of votes received, the number of paid up party members and donations received 










































I ..·•···· ·ppBuC:F.UNDING OF REPRESENTED POLiTICAL PARTIES ACT 103 OF 1997 
other assistance for the leadership and elected representatives. These 
activities are interrelated; maintaining a party organisation between elections 
facilitates a better and potentially more successful election campaign. 
Research capacity is valuable both during an election campaign and in the 
inter-election period. For the purpose of enhancing multi-party democracy, 
public funding should ideally cover both operating and campaign expenses. 
It should. however. be noted that not many countries support both op-
erational and campaign expenses. Most often funding is limited to cam-
paign costs. In Germany only operational costs are covered. Israel. on the 
other hand, covers both. Each party in the Knesset receives an annual 
amount calculated with respect to its number of members. In the election 
period a party receives a separate amount for campaign expenditure 
which. if the party's electoral support remains the same in the election. 
will be more than double its entitlement for operating expenses.·6 
The Act deals specifically with operating costs without excluding. how-
ever, the use of public funds during the early stages of an election campaign. 
3.1.1 Operating costs 
The Act has appropriately given a broad discretion to political parties for 
the use of public funding. Purposes which are regarded as "compatible" 
with the functioning of a political party "in a modern democracy", include 
the following: 
"(i) the development of the political will of people; 
(ii) bringing the political party's influence to bear on the shaping of public opinion; 
(iii) inspiring and furthering political education; 
(iv) promoting active participation by individual citizens in political life; 
(v) exercising an influence on political trends; and 
(vi) ensuring continuous. vital links between the people and organs of state."" 
Expenditure in pursuit of these broad goals covers a wide variety of ex-
penses. The Act wisely does not prescribe activities for which the funds 
may be used; rather it identifies those activities for which the funds may 
not be employed. There are four such categories. 
First, public moneys may not be used 
"for the purpose of directly or indirectly paying any remuneration, fee, reward, 
perquisite or other benefit to any person representing the party in the National 
16 For election expenditures a party is entitled to a financing unit (NIS 1 161 000 as of I 
December 1996 which converts into USS356 000) for each member in the outgOing 
Knesset, added to the number of seats the party wins in the incoming Knesset. divided 
by two. along With an additional sum equal to one financing unit (s 3(b) Parry Finance 
Law 1973). For operating costs a party receives monthly 5% of a financing unit for 
each member along with an additional sum equal to 5% of one financing unit (s 3(c)). 
17 S 5(1 )(b). The Israeli Party Finance Law of 1973 defines operational costs as expenses 
of a party "for the organisation of its activities. for propaganda and information and for 
the maintenance of organisational and ideological ties with the public, and includes Ii· 
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Assembly, National Council of Provinces, any provincial legislature or any local 
authority, or who holds any other office of profit under the State, whether on 
the national, provincial or local sphere of government", 18 
It establishes a sound principle that the purpose of the Fund is not to 
supplement the income of persons who already receive remuneration 
from the state, The rule is specific and in most instances it would be clear 
to whom it applies although difficulties may arise with determining who 
holds an "office of profit under the State". As a party must report to the 
Electoral Commission on the purposes for which the public money have 
been used, the onus should be on the political party to indicate positively 
what the usual occupation of a paid official is and that he or she does not 
hold an office of profit under the state. 
Second, public moneys may not be used 
"with a view to financing or contributing to any matter, cause, event or occa-
sion, whether directly or indirectly, in contravention of any code of ethics 
binding on the members of Parliament or of any provincial legislature, as the 
case may be".'· 
The provisions seek to ensure that political parties, apart from the public 
representatives, also abide by the parliamentary and provincial codes of 
ethics, 
Third, public moneys may not be used 
"directly or indirectly for the purpose of establishing any business or acquiring 
or maintaining any right or financial interest whatsoever in any business, or in 
any immovable property, except where the right or interest in the immovable 
property is to be used by the party solely for ordinary party-political purposes",20 
Public funds may thus not be used for any money-making ventures as well 
as for speculation on the property market. Buying a building for party 
headquarters is, however, permissible. 
Fourth, the Committee of the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces is given the authority to proscribe any other purpose 
that is "incompatible with a political party's functioning in a modern 
democracy",21 
As partisan interests may sway the Committee's definition of proscribed 
purposes, entrusting this task to the independent and detached judgment 
of the Electoral Commission would have been a preferable approach. 
3.1.2 Campaign costs 
The Act is clear that public funding is not to be used in the final stages of 
an election campaign, When Parliament and every provincial legislature 
are dissolved, political parties must close their books (dealing with the 
]8 S5(3){a). 
19 5 5(3)(b), 
20 5 5(3)(c), In the 1994 election, the Electoral Act 202 of 1993 (s 74(1)(b» provided that 
no public funds could be "utilized for the purposes of entertainment or for the purcha-
sing of any immovable property". 










































moneys they received from the Fund) 21 days before the polling day and 
repay to the Commission the unspent balances as at the date the books 
were c1osed.22 This does not prevent the use of public money for campaign 
purposes. First. elections are usually called well in advance of the election 
date which gives a party ample time to spend its public funds well before 
the 21 day cut off date. Second. as a percentage of the public moneys (as 
determined by the parliamentary Committee)23 may be carried over from 
one financial year to the next without affecting a party's entitlement for 
the next financial year.24 a party may even build up an election war chest. 
Thus. public moneys may be spent for election purposes. provided it is 
done 21 days before polling day. 
It is a pity that Parliament did not deem it fit to deal with the issue of 
campaign funding more directly. It is the most expensive item on any 
political party's budget and the enormity of the costs may both smother 
the voices of small. impoverished parties and lead to favour buying from 
the ruling party by monied interests. The failure to deal directly with 
election expenses will not contribute to the levelling of the political playing 
field at a time it matters most in a multi-party democracy. 
3.2 Adequate level of public funding 
The realisation of some classical first generation rights (such as the right to 
a free and fair election or a fair trial) reqUires the expenditure of adequate 
sums of public money. It can be argued that implementing those political 
rights which forms the basis of multi-party democracy - the right to form 
a political party. participate in its activities and campaign for it. likewise 
imposes financial obligations on the state. Indeed. section 236 of the 
Constitution was enacted to ensure that there is substance to the formal 
guarantees of multi-party democracy. This constitutional obligation thus 
entails the provision of funding which should be adequate for the en-
hancement of multi-party democracy. 
The Act provides that Parliament. in its discretion. appropriates moneys 
to the Fund.25 The wisdom of giving Parliament an unencumbered discre-
tion may be questioned. Determining an adequate level of public funding 
is inherently a contentious issue. The allocation of public funding may be 
criticized for being either too little or too much. The object of the legisla-
tion may be defeated if the level is merely tokenist. At the same time 
public funding could be criticized for being a further carriage to the gravy 
train; accusations are easily levelled that public funding is symptomatic of 
political parties looking after their own interests at the expense of the truly 
needy_ Furthermore. if the decision is made on an ad hoc basis. the proc-
ess could also be open to political manipulation. 
22 S 9(3). Where the National Assembly or a provincial legislature is dissolved. all parties 
represented in the dissolved legislature must close their books and repay unspent bal-
ance in proportion to their representation in the dissolved legislature (s 9(4)). 
23 S 9(1)(a). In the draft regulations of the joint Subcommittee of the joint Rules Commit-
tee 0 f 17 September 1998 the percentage is set at 50 (reg 9). 
24 S9(l)(b). 
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The question of who should determine how much money should be 
devoted to political parties. could have been addressed in a number of 
different ways. One approach is to fix the amount in legislation. In Ger-
many the actual amount available to parties is determined by lawz6 with 
the proviso that an independent committee may increase the amount to 
take into account inflation.27 Another approach is to place the responsibi-
lity in the hands of an independent body. In Israel an independent com-
mittee, headed by a judge appointed by the President of the Supreme 
Court, determines the value of a financing unit and thus the extent of public 
funding:8 
What options were open to the South African Parliament? In the Consti-
tution the remuneration of persons holding elected political office has 
been de politicized as far as possible. An Act of Parliament must establish a 
framework for determining (a) salaries, allowances and benefits of elected 
officials paid by the central government, and (b) the upper limits of sala-
ries, allowances and benefits for elected officials in the other spheres of 
government. 29 This Act may be passed only if Parliament has considered 
the recommendations made by an independent commission created 
specifically for this purpose.30 While Parliament has the final say in de-
termining remuneration, it should be guided by the independent commis-
sion, the raison d'etre of which is to determine, on the basis of objective 
criteria, justifiable remuneration packages for elected officials. With regard 
to political office. the Constitution thus establishes a model with combines 
the two approaches outlined above; an Act of Parliament passed in the 
light of recommendations made by an independent, specialist body. 
As the aim of political parties is ultimately to secure elected public office 
for its candidates, a similar approach would have been preferable when 
determining the level of public funding for political parties; while the 
amount of money should be determined by an Act of Parliament, it should 
be based on the recommendations of an independent, specialist body. 
The Electoral Commission could have fulfilled this specialist function. 
4 BENEFICIARIES 
4.1 "Political parties participating in national and provincial 
legislatures" 
The Constitution provids that only those political parties that are "partici-
pating in national and provincial legislatures" are entitled to public fund-
ing. A narrow definition would entail that only parties who are elected to 
and participate in the processes of the legislatures are entitled to public 
funding. A broader definition would hold that political parties who participate 
26 The Law on Political Parties as amended in 1994 establishes DM230 million as an 
absolute limit (art 18(2». 
27 Art 18(6} & (7). 
28 Political Parties (Financing) Law of 1973 s I a. 
29 S 219(1). 
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in elections in order to become members of legislatures, should also bene-
fit from state assistance. The Act opted for the narrow definition; as the 
name of the Act states, entitlement to moneys in the Fund is onlX for 
political parties represented in the national and provincial legislatures. 1 
This rule, which excludes unsuccessful parties from public funding, does 
not undercut the enhancement of multi-party democracy. To gain a seat in 
the 400 member National Assembly a very low threshold of electoral 
support applies; a party needs only 0,25 % of the votes cast (50 000 of the 
approximately 20 million voters). From a comparative perspective, South 
Africa's election threshold is one of the lowest in the world. Basing the 
funding threshold on the election threshold also makes it one of the most 
generous in the world.32 By excluding unelected parties it cannot be said 
that only the large established parties are favoured; any party with a modi-
cum of support will be represented in Parliament and thus receive funding. 
By limiting funding to operating costs, the Act has Sidestepped the issue 
of campaign costs for as yet unelected political parties. If campaign costs 
were covered. it could been argued that a broader definition of 
"participating" in the legislatures should apply; any party which gains a 
seat in the new legislature should be entitled to financial assistance for 
costs incurred during the election campaign. 
To ensure a vibrant multi-party democracy. there must be scope for 
new parties to emerge. Public funding should not be such that established 
parties are entrenched in legislatures at the expense of new emerging 
parties which may represent the legitimate voice of a sizeable portion of 
the electorate. In principle new parties should have access to public re-
sources including free media time. 
Their funding must, however, comply also with the distribution require-
ment of equity and proportionality.33 To comply with the principle of 
proportionality, any party, whether it was represented in a legislature or is 
new, should receive reimbursement for expenses incurred during the 
election campaign in proportion to its proven electoral support. Distri-
buting public funds after the election result ensures that the principle of 
proportionality is respected. However, it poses the following difficulty for 
31 S 5(1)(a). 
32 The German Federal Constitutional Court held in t 968 that a funding threshold of 2.5% 
was tOo high while a 0.5% threshold passed constitutional muster (see Gunlicks t 995, 
t 05). While the threshold for election to the 120 member Israeli Knesset is 1,5 %. [he 
funding threshold is I % . 
33 In the 1994 South African election this principle was not fully realised. Half of the 
"State Electoral Fund" for campaign expenses for political parties was distributed be-
fore the election as follows: an amount was allocated on an equal basis to all registered 
parties who showed "the potential support of at least two per cent of the voters" before 
the election or collected 10 000 Signatures. The other halF of the fund was distributed 
as follows: 50% was distributed equally amongst all parties who were entitled to at 
least one seat in a legislature while the remaining 50% was divided in proportion to 
the votes the parries received. This formula resulted that the ANC which won 62 % of 
the vote did not receive conSiderably more than the PAC which attracted only 1 % of 











































parties: they need money up front during the election campaign. Not 
many bank managers will be willing to gamble bank loans on the possible 
future electoral success of a party, particularly when that party tests the 
electoral waters for the first time. In Israel the problem is addressed in the 
following manner: For election expenses every party group in the Knesset 
gets a down payment of 60 % of the entitlement for each Knesset member 
(a financing unit). Where a party is not represented in the Knesset, it can 
claim 60 % of a maximum of 5 finance units on condition that it deposits a 
bank guarantee with the Chairman of the Knesset for that amount.H 
Should the down payment exceed the amount to which the party is enti· 
tled as determined by the election result, the party is liable to repay the 
down payment. This method of regulating down payments for election 
expenses against security appears to be a method which ensures that the 
principle of proportionality is maintained. 
4.3 Parties participating in "national and provincial 
legislatures" 
The phrase "political parties participating in national and provinciallegisla-
tures" is ambiguous. Does it mean that only parties which participate in 
both the national legislature and a provincial legislature are entitled to 
public funding? Or can the phrase be interpreted to include parties partici-
pating in the national or provincial legislatures? This question is important 
for a party which participates either at national or provincial level. The Act 
has interpreted this phrase inclusively - any party that is represented in 
the National Assembly or in any provincial legislature or both, is entitled 
to moneys from the Fund.;s 
There is, however, little indication how the money should be divided 
between the two spheres of legislatures. The Act provides that the pre-
scribed formula for the allocation of moneys from the Fund must be based 
"0) in part, on the principle of proportionality, taking into account, amongst 
others -
(aa) the relation that the number of such a party's representative bears to 
the membership of the National Assembly: or 
(bb) the relation that the number of such a party's representatives in any 
provincial legislature bears to the sum of the memberships of all the 
provincial legislatures jOintly; or 
(cc) the relation that the number of such a party's representatives in [the 
National Assembly and all provincial legislatures] jointly bears to the 
sum of the memberships of all those legislative bodies jOintly." 
The use of the disjunctive "or" is clearly incorrect and should probably 
read "and". As a minimum, the Committee should take all three ratios into 
account, because a political party represented only in a provincial legisla-
ture is also constitutionally entitled to an allocation. 
34 S 4{a2) Political Party (Finance) ACt of 1973. 










































In the proposed formula, drafted by the JOint Subcommittee of the JOint 
Rules Committee of Parliament,}6 the following method is used. Ninety 
percent of the funds go to the political parties represented in the National 
Assembly and the provincial legislatures proportional to their repre-
sentation in the National Assembly and all provincial legislatures. The 
remaining ten percent is divided proportionally between the nine provin-
cial legislatures according to the number of members of each legislature. 
The amount allocated to each legislature is then divided equally among all 
the parties in that legislature. A party's allocations in terms of the "pro-
portional" and "equity" formulae are then combined and paid into a 
party's bank account. No differentiation is thus made between national 
and provincial structures of a party. However, when it comes to repaying 
any unspent balance when an election is called for the National Assembly 
or in one province only,31 the party must refund any unspent balance on 
the basis of the percentage of the party's members in the dissolved legisla-
ture against the overall number of all its representatives. This formula is 
based on the notion that there is a proportional distribution of the funds 
between the party structures in the National Assembly and the provincial 
legislatures. In practice, however, the allocated funds are controlled centrally. 
The statutory division of funds between national and provincial legisla-
tures may reflect the relative importance which a country attaches to 
provincial government. In Germany the level of funding for parties at Land 
(state) level is equal to that at national level - OM 1 for each vote. How-
ever, where the amount to which all the parties are entitled is more than 
the absolute amount established by the Party Law, the excess is deducted 
from the parties' national organisations, leaving the Land parties' entitle-
ment untouched. 38 In contrast, in South Africa there is no attempt to 
strengthen provincial structures of political parties by allocating moneys to 
them directly. 
5 DISTRIBUTION FORMULA: "ON AN EQUITABLE AND 
PROPORTIONAL BASIS" 
The most elusive part of section 236 is the criterion for the distribution of 
public funds. The reqUirement that allocations should also be "equitable" 
is not only at odds with the calculable element of "proportional", but also 
defies easy definition. It was therefore not altogether surprising that the 
Act skirted around the issue. 
5.1 Proportionality 
Proportionality lies at the heart of the Constitution's system of repre-
sentative democracy,}9 and finds expression in the composition of the 
36 Committee Minutes of 17 September 1998. 
37 In terms of s 9(4). 
38 S 19(8} Law of Political Parties. 
39 The Constitutional Court has said in its First Certification-judgment that one of the 
fourteen "basic structures and premises of the constitutional text" was "representative 
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legislatures and their committees40 and the funding of parties by the 
legislatures." Proportionality should thus form the basis of any allocation 
of funds to political parties. 
Given the constitutional requirement of distribution on an "equitable 
and proportional basis", the Act thus provides that the prescribed formula 
must be based, "in part. on the principle of proportionality, taking into 
account, amongst others, the size of a party's representation in the legisla-
tures .. : 2 Measures which do not incorporate the principle of proportional-
ity would be constitutionally suspect: One example of a funding practice 
which conflict with this principle is the granting of lump sums .... 
5.2 Equitable 
The term "equitable" is neither self-explanatory nor defined in the Consti-
tution.45 It can, however, be given meaning in the context of section 236's 
objective the enhancement of multi-party democracy. From a comparative 
perspective it would appear that deviation is allowed from the strict appli-
cation of the proportionality principle where it is in support of small parties. 
Multi-party democracy requires as a minimum that public funding 
should enable parties to articulate the full range of political choices. In this 
context small parties, while posing no viable alternative to the party in 
power. nevertheless play an important role of articulating the full range of 
political choices, debating policy issues and scrutinizing executive action. 
The other side of the coin is that public funding should not undermine the 
very principle of multi-party democracy. If a party with 70% of the vote 
also gets 70% of the funding, it could lead to the strengthening of that 
party to the detriment of others, resulting in the demise of multi-party 
democracy. It can also be argued that allocating to the majority party in 
power funding in proportion to the election results would, in view of the 
numerous political and other advantages of incumbency, result in dispro-
portionate assistance to such party. 
From a comparative perspective the funding of small parties dispropor-
tionate to their support, is not uncommon. In Germany, parties receive 
OM 1.3 for every vote up to 5 million votes, and thereafter OM 1 per vote:· 
This formula. while maintaining the broad principle of proportionality, 
government embracing multi-party democracy, a common voters' roll and. in general. 
proportional representation" (In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa. 1996 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC) para 45). 
40 See s 193(5)(a). 
41 S 57(2)(c) and s 1 16(2)(c). 
42 S 5(2)(a). 
43 The German Federal Court held in 1992 that the granting to small parties of lump sums 
without reference to their actual electoral support was unconstitutional (Gunlicks 1995). 
44 In the 1994 election an amount was allocated on an equal basis to all parties which 
met the 2 % threshold of support as evidenced in credible opinion polls. The lump sum 
was supplemented by a further amount. which was based on success at the polls. 
45 S 214 of the Constitution provides for the "equitable division of revenue raised na-
tionally" in terms of an Act of Parliament. In determining the equitable division. Par-
liament must take into account a number of listed factors. 











































ensures that small parties remain viable by treating them more gener-
ously. In Israel the proportional allocation of funds is supplemented as 
follows: each party is entitled to one financing unit (US$356 000) for every 
Knesset member plus another unit regardless of its size. This formula 
would obviously benefit a micro party the most (bearing in mind that the 
threshold for election to the Knesset is 1,5 % of the votes). 
The guidelines provided by the Act also suggest that, in the interest of 
multi-party democracy, it would be eqUitable to treat small parties more 
favourably than large ones. In addition to the principle of proportionality, 
the prescribed formula must be based -
"in part, on the principle of equity, taking into account, amongst others-
(aa) a fixed threshold for a minimum allocation to each of the political parties 
represented [in the legislatures]; or 
(bb) a weighted scale of representation for an allocation to each of the politi-
cal parties ... ,,47 
The Act thus gives the parliamentary Committee the choice to adopt either 
an Israeli model and give each party a minimum allocation, or a German 
model of a weighted scale. Adopting either of these principles have policy 
implications. The Israeli model benefits primarily micro parties by ensur-
ing that each party in the legislatures, even with only one member, re-
ceives a base line of support equal to that of all other parties. Although 
micro parties perform an important articulation function, the very low 
threshold for entry into Parliament (0,25 % of the vote) may produce a 
proliferation of micro parties which may undermine stability in Parliament 
itself:a It may also foster parochial provincialism. A German model of a 
weighted scale, on the other hand, does not benefit micro parties specifi-
cally, but favours small parties of some substance (for example, having up 
to 10% of the vote). This model is preferred because small parties are able 
to perform most of the parliamentary functions vital to a vibrant 
multi-party democracy. It is thus submitted that it would have been 
preferable that these policy choices be made in the Act by enacting a 
clear formula. It would also have provided more certainty for minority 
parties against quick changes to the formula which the more informal 
and expeditious method of decision making of the Committee makes 
possible. 
The draft formula before the parliamentary Committee, supported by 
the twO largest parties, the African National Congress and the National 
Party, opts for the lump sum approach. Ninety percent of the funds go to the 
political parties represented in the National Assembly and provincial legisla-
tures proportional to their representation in the National Assembly and all 
provincial legislatures. The remaining ten percent is divided proportionally 
between the nine provincial legislatures according to the number of 
47 S 5(2)(a). 
48 Concentration of political power is of the widely recognised goals of an electOral 










































members. The amount allocated to each legislature is then divided equally 
among aU the parties in that legislature. Applied to the present composi-
tion of the legislatures, the allocations will be as follows:'9 
African National Congress 
National Party 
Inkatha Freedom Party 
Freedom Front 
Democratic Party 
Pan Africanist Party 




















The first question to be asked is whether this formula meets the 
"equitable" criterion set by section 236. Put differently, has the principle 
of proportionality been tempered sufficiently by the strengthening of 
smaller parties? While the equity component is absent or minimal for 
small parties with 10% of the vote, it is significant for the very small or 
micro parties. As no definitive definition of equity is possible, the Consti-
tutional Court may well, in making this value jUdgment, defer to the will of 
Parliament in this instance. 
The second question is whether the proposed lump sum formula en-
hances multi-party democracy within the South African context. In light of 
the imperative of nation building it does so in as far as it encourages 
parties to be represented in as many provincial legislatures as possible; 
parochial provincial parties do not benefit as much as broad based parties. 
The IFP thus gets less than its proportional share because it is represented 
only in two provincial legislatures. On the other hand, the formula may 
favour micro parties unduly. 
The smaller the party, the greater is its share of the cake. Thus, the Mi-
nority Party with one representative in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial 
Legislature receives four times the amount which is proportionally due to 
it. With one MPL out of total of 825 MPs and MPLs (0,1 %) it would receive 
0,1 % of the 90 % proportional allocation, plus, being one of seven parties 
in the KwaZulu Provincial Legislature, a seventh of KwaZulu-Natal's 19,9 % 
of the 10% "equitable" allocation. This gives a total entitlement of 0,4 % of 
the Fund. If there were less parties represented in the KwaZulu Provincial 
Legislature. the Minority Party's share would have been even greater. 
Public funding may form a significant part of a micro party's overall 
funding. not only reducing its "Parteifreiheit". but also sustaining it artifi-
cially beyond its voters' appeal. Where coalition governments are formed 
(a prospect enhanced by the system of proportional representation), the 
proliferation of micro parties, fostered by public funding. may impact 
negatively on the stability of legislatures and governments. It is therefore 
submitted that a weighted scale, linked to a party's actual strength and 
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producing more proportional results, would be more appropriate because 
it would strengthen small rather than micro parties. 
6 MANAGING AND OVERSEEING PUBLIC FUNDING: THE ROLE 
OF THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION 
The Electoral Commission is one of the state institutions whose task it is to 
"strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic".50 Apart from its 
function of managing elections,51 ensuring that they are "free and fair",52 
the Constitution stipulates that the Commission may have "additional 
power and functions prescribed by national legislation".5l In terms of the 
Electoral Commission ActS< the Commission is assigned the responsibility 
of registering political parties.5s It was thus fitting to entrust the Commis-
sion also with the management of the Represented Political Parties Fund. 
Its role is, however, limited to overseeing the financial administration of 
the Fund and the spending of allocated moneys by political parties. 
Granting it a broader role on the level of policy could have enhanced the 
legitimacy of public funding. The independent and detached judgment 
and expertise of the Commission could have been brought to bear on the 
size of the annual budget of the Fund and proscribed expenditures. This 
would have removed much of the public criticism that public funding of 
political parties is driven by political parties for their own interest. 
The function of the Commission is to oversee the administration of the 
Fund and the use by parties of their allocated moneys. This is an impor-
tant task because when public funds are spent by private institutions such 
as political parties, the public has a great interest that such funds have 
been correctly spent and adequately accounted for. The essential ele-
ments of the accounting system established by the Act are the following: 
Each party mUSt appoint an office-bearer or official of that party as ac-
counting officer. who must take responsibility for the proper management 
and accounting of the moneys received.s6 A separate bank account must 
be opened for keeping public money distinct from privately generated 
funds.57 The accounting officer must keep separate books and records of 
account regarding the receipt and use of such moneys. 58 For each financial 
year the accounting officer must prepare a statement showing all amounts 
received by the party and how they have been applied.59 These accounts 
must be audited by independent auditors who must specifically express an 
opinion as to "whether the allocated moneys were spent for purposes not 
50 S 181( 1){f). 
51 S 190(1)(a). 
52 S 190(1 )(b). 
53 S 190(2). 
54 Chapter 4 Act 51 of 1996. 
55 See chapter 4. 
56 S 6(1 )(b). 
57 S 6(l)(a). 
58 S 6(2). 











































authorised by this Act".60 This report must be submitted to the Electoral 
Commission within three months after the end of a financial year!' In 
addition the Auditor-General may at any time audit a party's books and 
records of accounts dealing with moneys received from the Fund.62 By 
way of enforcement, the Commission may suspend the allocation of funds 
to a party if it is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the party has failed 
to comply with the Act.·' This may be done only if the Commission has 
informed the party of the proposed suspension and called for reasons why 
it should not proceed to do SO.64 The Commission must also recover from 
an accounting officer any moneys which were irregularly spent!S Finally, 
the Commission must report annually to Parliament regarding its man-
agement and administration of the Fund. 66 
7 CONCLUSION 
In assessing whether the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties 
Act of 1997 meets the objective and requirements of section 236 of the 
Constitution, the conclusion is a qualified yes. Parliament has met the 
minimum constitutional reqUirements of the section but the Act falls short 
of giving full effect to the spirit and purport of section 236 by not address-
ing issues which are vital to the enhancement of multi-party democracy. 
Parliament did not utilise this opportunity to link public funding of po-
litical parties with the disclosure and regulation of their private funding. 
The occasion on which public moneys are deposited in the private pockets 
of political parties provided the best opportunity to realise the public claim 
that full disclosure of private funding should be given in return. 
The issue of campaign expenses has largely been avoided. As the most 
expensive item on a party's budget. it is a critical factor in the levelling of 
the political playing field. It is thus prone to have the most corrupting 
effect on political parties and the political process. The position of new 
parties during an election was also omitted. Without access to some public 
funding. it may be difficult for a new party to gain representation in the 
legislatures. 
Given public sensitivity around public funding of political parties, the 
funding process would have benefited from the independent judgment 
and expertise of the Electoral Commission in advising about the size of the 
budget to be distributed and proscribed expenditures. 
The Act has failed to deal adequately with the contentious issue of the 
formula for the allocation of funds to political parties. While the Act pro-




63 5 6(7)(a)(i). 
64 56(7). 
65 57. 










































PUBtle FUNDING OF REPRE?J3NTED POLlTICALPARTtES ACT I 05 OF j 997 
formula, the policy choices implicit in it, should preferably have been 
established in the Act itself. While the draft regulations, prescribing the 
formula, should meet the constitutional standard of "proportional and 
equitable", a weighted scale may have produced a more appropriate result 
of strengthening small rather than micro parties. 
In conclusion, while the Act has met the constitutional demands of sec-
tion 236 of the Constitution, it is inadequate by itself to ensure a level 
political playing field in which multi-party democracy can thrive. At best, 
the Act should be seen to be an important first step in a long process of 
ensuring a vibrant multi-party democracy in South Africa. 
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